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LAX00GA025 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On October 25, 1999, at 1537 hours Pacific daylight time, a MD Helicopter, Inc. (MDHI) 500N helicopter, N904PD, collided with a city street in San Jose, California, following an in-flight loss of control during an approach to the San Jose International Airport. The helicopter, operated by the City of San Jose Police Department as a public-use flight under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, was destroyed during the collision sequence. The airline transport pilot and nonrated passenger were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company flight plan was filed. The flight originated about 1524 from Reid-Hillview airport and was en route to San Jose International Airport. While on a routine patrol on October 23, 1999, the pilot and a police observer, who was flying the aircraft, experienced an uncommanded yaw of about 10 degrees to the right while practicing stuck pedal maneuvers. In his statement, the observer reported that after ascertaining that neither of them had made a control input, the pilot took control and made a precautionary landing at the Reid-Hillview airport. The observer said that the pilot reported the pedals felt mushy, but he had control authority. The next day a contract maintenance technician arrived and was unable to find a discrepancy in the anti-torque control system (see Aircraft Information for a more detailed discussion). The pilot and technician believed the problem was in the Yaw Stability Augmentation System (YSAS), and it was deactivated in accordance with the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) procedures in order to fly the helicopter back to the maintenance base at San Jose International. Prior to departing on the accident flight, the pilot made several left and right pedal turns while in a hover. A review of the air-ground communications tapes from the San Jose International Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), revealed that the pilot contacted the facility about 4 miles east of the airport and requested landing at taxiway "Victor." The pilot was cleared to crossover the airport midfield at or above 1,000 feet agl for a left downwind. He was given the wind, altimeter setting, and transponder code. The pilot read back the instructions. Runways 30R, 30L, and 29 were in use. The pilot stated he was going to Aris Helicopters and was cleared to land on taxiway "Victor" paralleling the active runways. His next transmission at 1535:21 was "Police 1, mayday, mayday," and then again "mayday, mayday" 3 seconds later. Witnesses reported seeing the helicopter yawing erratically then descending rapidly while spiraling. Controllers on duty in the ATCT observed the helicopter while on downwind for runway 29. One controller observed the helicopter "in erratic flight . . . (then) . . . plummet to the ground." Another controller observed the helicopter "approximately 1 to 1 1/4 mile base leg when it just fell out of the sky." Another controller assumed that the pilot was performing an autorotation and queried the others about the maneuver. The last controller observed the helicopter in a tight spiral on the left downwind and alerted the supervisor. Twenty-one ground witnesses were identified and interviewed. Of the 21 witnesses, 15 observed the helicopter spin, although only 4 were able to quantify the direction as a "counter clockwise" rotation. Eight of the witnesses said they heard unusual engine sounds and they variously described them as "whining" or "choking/sputtering." One of the witnesses reported a "tighter and tighter" spin as the helicopter descended, while another said it was a "tight 180-degree turn." One witness said the tail "appeared to be bouncing back and fourth," while a second witness observed that the helicopter "started to rotate [one direction] and reversed direction," then spiraled straight down. 1.1.1 Radar Derived Flight Path Recorded radar data in the form of a CDR Editor listing was obtained from the San Francisco Bay Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). The data was recorded and processed by the TRACON's ARTS IIIA system using a surveillance antenna at the Moffett Federal Airport, located about 8 miles northwest of the accident site. The antenna rotates clockwise at a 4.7-second sweep rate. The data reviewed was the time of each secondary beacon return, the recorded target position, the Mode C altitude, ground track heading, and ground track speed. According to the facility, the ARTS IIIA system computes target ground speed and ground track heading based on a smoothing algorithm, which averages the last several data points. In addition, recorded plot data was obtained from the San Jose International Airport noise abatement monitoring office. The facility obtains a direct feed of radar data from the Bay TRACON ARTS IIIA system and incorporates sound microphone decibel data to form an integrated picture of the tracks of departing, arriving, or over flight aircraft at the airport. The raw recorded radar data is processed in a computer program, Airport Noise and Operations Monitoring System (ANOMS), written by Lochard Company. The ANOMS program also uses a smoothing algorithm to compute and present target ground speed and track heading information. Recorded raw radar data (time, position, and Mode C altitude) was also processed in a computer program Tactical Mapping by ERM, Inc. This program computes target point-to-point airspeed and heading without smoothing algorithms. The tabular and graphically plotted radar data from all three sources is appended to this report. Review of the data disclosed that the secondary beacon return was tracking west on a heading averaging 270 degrees at a Mode C reported altitude of 1,100 feet and a ground speed, which varied from 104 knots to 119 knots. As the target track passed over the airport midfield, the ground track heading turned left over the time frame 1534:16 to 1535:12 from 268 degrees to 126 degrees. The computed rate of turn was 2.4 degrees per second. Over the same time interval, the ground speed decreased to 115 knots. According to the air-ground communications tapes, 11 seconds after achieving the 126-degree heading, the pilot broadcasted the first "mayday" call. During this 11-second time interval, the Mode C reported altitude decreased to 900 feet as the ground speed decreased to 103 knots. Coincident with the "mayday" call, the Mode C reported altitude jumped from 900 to 1,100 feet in one 4.7-second radar antenna sweep interval, followed in the next 4.7-second sweep with a decrease to 800 feet. Over this same 9.4-second time frame, the ground speed decreased to 80 knots. The last secondary beacon return was recorded at 1535:31. Point-to-point computation of the ground track speed over the last four 4.7-second antenna sweeps yielded speeds of 79.7, 72.8, 56.3 and 23.2, then ground impact. 1.5 PERSONNEL INFORMATION Review of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airman Certification records disclosed that the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a multiengine land airplane rating. In addition, he held commercial pilot privileges for single engine airplanes land and sea, and rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot held an instrument rating for airplanes and helicopters. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for single and multiengine airplanes, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instruments. The most recent second-class medical certificate was issued to the pilot on October 30, 1998, and contained no limitations. According to San Jose Police Department (SJPD) records, the pilot had accumulated a total flight time of 2,586 hours, consisting of about 1,215 hours of military helicopter flight time, and about 1,266 hours in the MDHI NOTAR (No Tail Rotor) helicopter. In the preceding 90 and 30 days, the pilot had flown 88 and 31 hours, respectively, in the 500N helicopter. 1.5.1 Pilot Training The records indicate that the pilot successfully completed a MDHI 500N NOTAR Pilot's Recurrent Flight Training Course conducted at the Mesa, Arizona, factory on May 11, 1999. The course included both ground and flight instruction in anti-torque failure emergency procedures in the helicopter. The pilot's SJPD training file is attached to this report. The pilot was also a member of the California Air National Guard (CANG) assigned to the 129th Rescue Wing based at Moffett Federal Air Field, San Jose. He is a designated military aviator assigned to fly the HH-60G helicopter as first pilot. The HH-60 is the Air Force version of the Army UH-60, commonly known as the Blackhawk. According to the pilot's military records, he transitioned to the HH-60 helicopter during an active duty training period from April through September 1996. As of his last flight with the CANG on October 22, 1999, the pilot had accumulated a total flight time in the HH-60 of 416 hours, with 120 hours flown in the past 12 months. According to the wing safety officer, during the pilot's initial transition training in 1996, he would have been given a very thorough indoctrination in the emergency procedures specific to the HH-60, including the loss of anti-torque capability. In addition to the initial transition training, the wing safety officer reported that pilot had routine refresher training during the year with various unit instructor pilots. His most recent recurrent emergency procedures training in the HH-60G with the unit was on October 15, 1999. Review of the anti-torque failure procedures for the MDHI 520N and the HH-60G revealed that they are diametrically opposed to one another. A detailed discussion of the two procedures can be found under AIRCRAFT INFORMATION, paragraph 1.6.3. Additional information on this topic can be found in TESTS AND RESEARCH, paragraph 1.16.6. 1.5.2 Maintenance Technician Certification and Training The maintenance technician who examined the helicopter on October 24 is employed by ARIS Helicopters, the FAA Approved Repair Station contracted by the San Jose Police Department to maintain their helicopters. According to FAA records, the technician holds an FAA Airframe and Powerplant certificate and is the Chief Inspector of the repair station. According to MDHI records, the technician/inspector completed a 2-week maintenance course on the 500N helicopter in July 1997. The fatally injured passenger, also employed by ARIS Helicopters as the inspector's assistant, held an FAA Airframe and Powerplant certificate. 1.6 HELICOPTER INFORMATION 1.6.1 General McDonnell Douglas Helicopter System (hereinafter referred to as MDHS) transferred ownership of type certificate H3WE to MD Helicopters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as MDHI) on February 18, 1999. Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas, including the helicopter division, and subsequently spun off the commercial line into McDonnell Douglas Helicopter System. At the time of the accident, Boeing was providing engineering support functions to MDHI for the commercial helicopter product line. The 500N helicopter is a five place, turbine powered, rotary-wing aircraft constructed primarily of aluminum alloy, while the tail boom and anti-torque thruster assemblies are primarily a graphite composite. The main rotor is a fully articulated five-bladed system. 1.6.2 NOTAR Anti-Torque System Description According to the manufacturer, the NOTAR (no tail rotor) design provides anti-torque control by using low pressure, high volume air ducted through the tail boom. The anti-torque control system has sufficient authority to induce large and prolonged sideslip angles at cruise airspeeds. Some of the low pressure air flows out through downward oriented slots along the right side of the tail boom, which combines with the rotor downwash to create a circulation controlled low pressure area on the boom's right side. The balance of the low pressure air flows out through a pilot controlled directional jet thruster at the end of the tail boom. A variable pitch fan with the blade pitch controlled by anti-torque pedal inputs is enclosed in the aft fuselage section immediately forward of the tail boom and driven by the main rotor transmission through a fan gearbox and drive shaft. The circulation control tail boom, jet thruster assembly, horizontal stabilizer, and two vertical stabilizers make up the rest of the anti-torque system. In forward flight, the vertical stabilizers work with the thruster assembly to provide the required anti-torque forces as well as directional control to maintain fuselage heading. The left vertical stabilizer is controlled by the cockpit pedal movement, while the right vertical stabilizer is controlled independently by the YSAS system. Control of the anti-torque system is by pilot pedal inputs and torque/push-pull tubes to a splitter assembly located over the left cabin area at FS113. From the splitter, one torque tube controls the fan blade pitch while another control goes to the left vertical stabilizer and jet thruster cone by way of a two-part thruster cable, which terminates at a bellcrank beneath the horizontal stabilizer. The bellcrank transmits motion via another cable to a pulley assembly that rotates the jet thruster cone. The cables are flexible and have a quick disconnect fitting at the tail boom to fuselage junction, which joins the forward cable to the center cable. The left pedal input pulls the cable forward and applies a tension load and the right pedal input pushes on the cable and applies a compression load. The jet thruster cone rotates on the end of the tail boom to direct the high volume, low-pressure air left or right. At the forward end of the forward thruster cable, the cable housing is fixed to a bracket on the fuselage at station 123.3 and the rod end of the internal (Teflon wrapped) cable is attached to the control splitter assembly, also referred to as the "Station 113 bellcrank." In between the fuselage bracket and the splitter, the flexible internal cable is supported by a two-part telescoping sleeve. One part of the sleeve, the forward part, is attached to and travels with the rod end and internal cable. The aft part of the telescoping sleeve is attached to the fuselage bracket by means of a ball (swivel) coupling and remains stationary with the fuselage bracket. The two halves of the telescoping sleeve slide within one another to prevent the flexible interior cable from bowing. The angular misalignment induced by the splitter assembly travel is accommodated by a ball coupling on the telescoping sleeve. 1.6.3 RFM Emergency Procedures Review of the Emergency and Malfunction Procedures section of the FAA approved RFM for the Model 500N revealed that sub-section 3-9 discusses ANTI-TORQUE FAILURES. The section states, "Different types of failures may require slightly different techniques for optimum success in recovery . . . therefore, it is not possible to provide a standardized solution for an anti-torque emergency." Two cautionary notes are listed for ANTI-TORQUE FAILURES. One states, "Do not attempt an autorotation from forward flight unless an actual engine failure occurs." The other note warns the pilot, "Do not attempt flight below 20 knots" during an ANTI-TORQUE FAILURE. Powered run-on landings are to be made, with throttle manipulation used, to assist in maintaining directional control. USAF technical order "TO 1H-60(U)A-1" is the military equivalent of the RFM for the HH-60. The emergency procedures section dealing with anti-torque drive failures in cruise were reviewed. The immediate pilot action items are; 1) Autorotate, and 2) Throttles to Idle. Three warnings are prominently positioned in the section. The first one states, "Attempts to maintain powered flight may result in unrecoverable loss of control or tail structural failure." The second warning note states, "If autorotation is delayed, excessive yaw angles will cause low indicated airspeed...[which] can make it more difficult to establish or maintain autorotation." The final warning note reads, "Left pedal application will cause . . . decreasing yaw control." 1.6.4 Maintenance History The helicopter, SN LN032, was issued a standard airworthiness certificate in the Normal Category. Review of the helicopter maintenance records disclosed that at the time of the accident, the helicopter had accumulated 5,972.3 total flight hours. The last documented 1,200-hour and annual inspections were combined and occurred on September 30, 1999, at 5,900 total flight hours. The logbook entry notes that 100, 300, and 600-hour inspections were accomplished at the time of the annual inspection, and were performed in accordance with Boeing Form 1594 and the Chapter 5 inspection checklist. Beyond the October 23 uncommanded yaw event, no unresolved maintenance discrepancies existed. The tail boom was last demated from the fuselage on July 23, 1999, for replacement of the anti-torque system fan liner. During the annual inspection on September 30, the thruster cable tensions were adjusted. According to MDHI, tension can only be adjusted on the aft cable. A maintenance records entry noted that both "forward and aft thruster cables" were removed for replacement on July 26, 1995, due to an unusual noise in the cable; the entry referenced part numbers 500N7201-37 and -45. According to MDHI, the part numbers referenced (500N7201-37 and -45) refer to the forward and center cables. The cables were replaced at 1,970 total hours. The representative of ARIS Helicopters produced documentation showing that the removed cable assembly was returned to MDHS on July 27, 1995. MDHI could not produce any records that the cables were received. At the time of the accident the replacement cables had accrued about 4,002 hours of operation. Review of the maintenance manual for the helicopter revealed that at the time of the accident, there were recurring 100- and 300-hour inspections of the cable system. The cables have no in service time limits. 1.6.5 Maintenance Actions Following October 23 Uncommanded Yaw Following the unusual feel to the anti-torque pedals during the patrol flight on October 23 and the precautionary landing at Reid-Hillview airport, the chief inspector/contract maintenance technician for the operator arrived at Reid-Hillview to inspect the helicopter on October 24, which was his regular day off work. According to the technician's statement, during a discussion of the previous night's events, the pilot stated that the anti-torque pedal movements did not feel normal to him. The pilot told the technician that he thought the left pedal was too far forward in the relaxed state. The technician said he could not recall exactly the relaxed state relative positions of the pedals and moved them left and right from stop to stop; he said they felt smooth without binding, but with what seemed to be an excessive amount of spring pressure. According to MDHI, at rest the maximum pedal misalignment shall be 0.50 inches. The technician said he then inspected the anti-torque system in detail without finding any obvious discrepancies. According to his statement, he first rotated the thruster cone, which had a "normal" feel, and noted a corresponding movement of the left vertical stabilizer. He next removed the thruster cone and inspected the rear cable and associated bellcranks and pulleys. The technician then removed the front seats and center console and inspected the anti-torque system torque tubes and bungee in the cockpit area. He next looked at the Station 113 bellcrank/splitter by looking down the engine inlet from the front of the helicopter without removing the left-hand engine inlet fairing to gain complete access to the bellcrank. The technician observed the movement of the fan blades through the air inlet screen as the pilot moved the anti-torque pedals. As a final step, the technician examined the anti-torque cable quick disconnect fitting at the tail boom to fuselage join point and observed the cable connection slide smoothly back and fourth with the fitting cover moved to expose the connection. As part of the system inspection, the technician performed a preflight check of the YSAS System as specified in the RFM. During the check, the trailing edge of the right vertical stabilizer is held lightly with fingertips. With the YSAS systems powered up and engaged the tail boom is moved back and forth by hand. The YSAS rate gyro is designed to sense the induced yaw and compensate by moving the right vertical stabilizer. The technician induced a simulated yaw while the helicopter was on the skids. The stabilizer did not move. The pilot, observer, and technician concluded that the YSAS system had failed the night before. The pilot's flight manual addresses the ground check in section 4-6 and 4-7, and is attached to this report. On the next day, the day of the accident, the maintenance technician arrived at the helicopter in the late morning with the intention of performing a full yaw system rigging check. In his statement, he said that while reading through the maintenance manual, he decided not to actually re-rig the helicopter, but to check the "bottom line numbers" of the relative movements of various system components specified in a rigging procedure. He stated that he made up a matrix to record and check the various measurements. The left hand inlet fairing cover was removed to gain access to the Station 113 bellcrank/splitter assembly and the rigging of the pedals, fan blade pitch, thruster cone, and left vertical stabilizer were checked. The mechanic did not observe any discrepancies. Subsequent examination revealed that the failed portion of the telescoping sleeve ball coupling swivel fitting was on the interior side of the fitting and could not have been observed without the aid of an inspection mirror. According to the maintenance technician, prior to departure on the flight back to San Jose International, the pilot performed three separate hover pedal turn series, both left and right. The pilot then announced over the loud speaker "everything felt good." 1.6.6 YSAS System Description The YSAS system is composed of three components, a yaw rate gyroscope, a computer, and an electromechanical actuator connected to the right vertical stabilizer. According to MDHI, the YSAS system has a control authority equal to 10 percent of the total yaw control system. The right-hand vertical stabilizer has a range of movement of 15 degrees left and right. The YSAS system is effective at speeds above 40 knots but has little or no effect below this speed value. 1.7 METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The San Jose International Airport METAR at 1537 was reporting in part: sky clear; visibility 20 miles; winds from 290 degrees at 12 knots; and altimeter setting 30.13. According to the air-ground communications transcript, when the pilot was cleared to enter the San Jose airspace, he was given wind 300 degrees at 13, and the altimeter setting of 30.13 inHg. Subsequently, he was cleared to land on taxiway "victor" and given a wind update of 290 degrees at 12. No unusual weather phenomena were noted during a review of the meteorological reports, or, observed by any witnesses. The San Jose International airport noise abatement monitoring system and the recorded TRACON radar data show there were no go-arounds or over flights of the airport by air carrier or other large airplanes within 30 minutes prior to the accident. 1.8 WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION Safety Board investigators examined the wreckage at the accident site location of the Alameda and Alameda Way streets in a San Jose residential/business area about 1 mile southwest of the airport. The helicopter impacted near the center lane of a five-lane city street. Trees and power lines up to 100 feet agl surrounded the wreckage, and a three-story building was immediately south of the road. The main fuel cell was ruptured and a fuel spill was observed on the street pavement. The fuselage was observed to be oriented on a 050-degree magnetic bearing. Extensive vertical crushing and structural collapse was evident to the fuselage. The left skid was separated from the cross tubes and folded under the fuselage while the right skid was separated and folded outboard. The crush lines on the fuselage were observed to be 10 degrees nose down for the longitudinal axis and 30 degrees left side down for the lateral axis. The majority of the wreckage was confined to about a 50-foot radius of the fuselage center, with a section of the blue rotor blade located about 60 feet from the fuselage. The right forward cabin door was found about 41.4 feet northeast. Gyro stabilized binoculars were found in an office building atrium about 100 feet southwest of the main wreckage. The blue blade fractured just outboard of the root doublers, with upward bending distortion evident. The remaining four rotor blades were attached to the rotor hub. Chordwise scuffing was found on the tip ends, and a circular scar was found on the asphalt street over the left forward quadrant in front of the wreckage at the approximate rotor disk radius. All lead-lag dampers were intact and secured to their respective blades. The pitch change links were secured to the blade pitch horns and the swashplate. The cockpit collective, cyclic, and anti-torque control system components beneath the cockpit floor were crushed and distorted. The left and right cockpit yaw control pedals were fractured and separated from their respective posts. All fractures to the system push-pull and torque tubes were accompanied by bend deformation to the associated tubes. The lateral and longitudinal trim actuators and all associated components were crushed and bent. The upper lateral, longitudinal and collective pitch control rod end bearings at FS78.5 were intact, connected to the mixer assembly, and were undamaged. The upper end of the FS78.5 yaw control rod remained attached to the FS97.5 bellcrank. The FS97.5 bellcrank mounting bracket was damaged with an impression of the bellcrank arm present on the front side of the bracket (rearward movement of the arm). The control tube, which connects the FS97.5 bellcrank to the FS113 splitter was fractured at the rear rod end bearing, with 45-degree shear lips evident on the grainy textured fracture face. The FS113 splitter assembly rack had punctured the upper fuselage deck with a rearward and downward motion beyond the limit stops. The splitter spring was intact and attached to its respective lugs. Control continuity was established from the splitter to the fan blade pitch mechanism. At the FS113 splitter, the intermediate control rod (controlling pitch of the NOTAR fan blades) was attached to the splitter arm and the FS137 bellcrank, but was bent about 15 degrees. The aft control tube, which transmits motion between the FS137 bellcrank and the fan transmission, was bent about 10-degrees at the forward fan drive shaft coupling, which was fractured and separated. The fan and its gearbox transmission rotated freely. The forward thruster cable rod end bearing remained attached to the FS113 splitter assembly. During laboratory examination of the telescopic swivel ball joint it was determined that it had been separated from it's swaged fitting. A fracture was noted that extended about 180 degrees around the swaged fitting, with a longitudinal fracture that connected each end of the circumferential fracture to the fitting end. The missing portion of swaged fitting was not located at the accident site. The circumferential fracture face appeared corroded and the longitudinal fractures had both corroded and shiny sections. Other longitudinal cracks were apparent around the remaining circumference of the swaged fitting end. Subsequent investigation disclosed that once liberated from the swaged fitting, the ball swivel telescoping rod end would move away from the swaged fitting exposing 2.95 inches of inner Teflon coated cable. The Teflon coating of the inner cable was abraded/missing over about a 2.5-inch span, with fragments of Teflon material adhering to the sharp edges of the fracture. (See the Seal Laboratory report appended to this file). The forward and center thruster cables were disconnected from each other at the quick disconnect fitting at the tail boom to fuselage juncture (FS174). The sliding fitting sleeve, which covers the male/female cable joint fitting, was damaged, crushed, and distorted in shape. The tail boom slot for the cable immediately aft of the fitting sleeve was damaged and a rubber grommet was torn. The center cable aft rod end bearing remained attached to the left-hand horizontal stabilizer control assembly; however, the thruster and vertical stabilizer torque tube housing assembly, ref: part number 600N7200-501, was broken from the structure below the horizontal stabilizer. The FS264 composite support bracket was found fractured and separated from its mounting point. The conduit cap immediately forward of the composite support bracket was circumferentially fractured, with corrosion apparent on the fracture face. The control rod end bearings from the thruster and vertical stabilizer control torque tube to the aft thruster cone pulley remained attached, and, the cable that runs between the two pulleys was intact. The control torque tube assembly, P/N 600N7200-501, was severed from it's structural mount. The jet thruster cone was found in the full right yaw position with evidence of over travel. The tail boom was diagonally severed at a point just forward of the horizontal stabilizer and within the rotational radius of the main rotor disk. Witness marks and paints transfers were found on the tip end of the blue main rotor blade, which matched the fuselage color at the point of tail boom separation. The center thruster cable exhibited abrasion marks and permanent set deformation at the point of tail boom severance. The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the severed end of the tail boom. The right vertical stabilizer was intact. The left vertical stabilizer upper section was intact; however, the lower section was damaged, and had separated from the structure and was found adjacent to the tail boom. The cockpit throttle and the engine fuel control index pointers were both found at the ground idle position. Instrument indications were zero except for the N1 gauge, which read 41 percent 1.13 MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION On October 26, 1999, the Santa Clara County Medical Examiner performed an autopsy on the pilot. During the course of the procedure, the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, obtained samples for toxicological analysis. According to the report, the analysis was negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and all screened drug substances. An autopsy was performed on the right seat passenger by the Santa Clara County Medial examiner on October 26, 1999. The following information was extracted from autopsy report. The cause of death was listed as "Multiple Traumatic Injuries." Noted Under "External Injuries": "Head: Two juxtaposed 2-inch-long lacerations split the back of the head slightly above the occipital prominence [at the back of the head], beneath which a shattered calvarium [upper portion of the skull] is palpable." "The face presents with a bruise mark above the left eyebrow. A 2-inch-long gaping laceration occupies the left side of the chin, along the left mandible. There are two smaller, 1 1/2-inch-long lacerations overlying the right mandibular angle. There is presence of blood within the ear canals bilaterally. ..." "The anterior aspect of the abdominal wall is covered by a well-defined, horizontal, 1-inch-wide bruise mark at the level of the umbilicus [navel] and extending laterally to the flanks. There are also some additionally faintly visible bruise marks slightly above the above described horizontal bruise mark overlying the right upper quadrant. ..." Under "Internal Injuries" is noted: "Head: Focal subgaleal hematoma [bruising beneath the scalp] formation at the site of the above described laceration. The calvarium and the bones of the base of the skull present with a hinge-type fracture passing across the petrous processes and the sella turcica and extending onto the right parietal bone and the occipital bone posteriorly . ..." "Chest: ...The thoracic aorta shows a complete transection [tear] slightly distal to the origin of the left subclavian artery. ..." 1.16 TESTS AND RES